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ABSTRACT

-

This article explores competing views on Michael
Milken in order to draw insights about American law and
culture. Milken has been describedas a genius, a thief, an
industrial revolutionary, a rapacious predator, and the
person you would want your children to be when they
grow up. Some praise Milken for inspiringthe use of high
yield debt to finance acquisitions. His approach to
corporate finance helped birthed a merger wave in the
1970s and 80s and normalized the use of high-yield debt
as an investment vehicle and a reorganization tool.1
Others see Milken as a symbol of personal greed and
social pathology. Critics have charged that his use of debt
to takeover and restructure companies (often laying off
employees) is akin to piracy and represents the very worst
of a capitalisteconomy.
These conflicting interpretations of one man's
career point to a schism in moral values. Some see the
reports of Milken's work ethic, ambition, and
mathematical genius as qualities to encourage in our
society. Others see these attributes as a threat to social
1

PATRICK A. GAUGHAN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, & CORPORATE

RESTRUCTURINGS, 371-375 (7th ed. 2018).
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stability and decency. To demonstrate this moral divide,
this article explores the financial rise and the regulatory
fall of Milken and compares the commentary of his
detractors and supporters. In addition, this article
highlights how conflicting notions of fairness lead to
disparate legal treatment of otherwise identical behavior.
For example, the law views buying realproperty based on
an informational advantage as fair and legally
acceptable, while buying stock with an informational
advantage is considered unfair and often results in legal

liability.
The evidence suggests that this moral divide is
based on more than disagreements among Americans
about what constitutes moral business behavior and the
required characteristics of a just society. The evidence
suggests that many Americans are internallyconflicted on
these questions.
I. The Rise of Milken
II. The Decline of Milken
III. The Moral Schism
IV. Conclusion
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I. The Rise of Milken
Although Milken received his master's degree in
business administration from the Wharton School in
Philadelphia, it was at U.C. Berkeley where he developed
his passion for high-risk, high-yield debt securities. 2 At
Berkeley, Milken discovered two empirical studies that
supported an investment strategy that he had already
put into practice as a college student. 3 Studies by W.

Braddock Hickman and T. R. Atkinson showed that over
2 CONNIE BRUCK,

THE PREDATOR'S BALL: THE INSIDE STORY OF
JUNK BOND RAIDERS, 27-28

DREXEL BURNHAM AND THE RISE OF THE

(1989).
3 Id.
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the long-term, investments in low-rated bonds provided
a higher return than investments in high-rated bonds. 4

Upon reading those studies, Milken "became convinced
that the market .. . did not understand the true riskiness
of bonds." 5 After graduating from Wharton in 1970,
Milken took his passion to the bonds trading desk of
Drexel Firestone, a once prestigious investment bank.6
Critics scorned him for dealing with low-grade
investments and because of his Jewish ancestry, but
Milken regularly generated profits for Drexel while more
prestigious divisions of the bank were losing money. 7
When the noticeably Jewish Burnham and
Company acquired the predominantly Protestant Drexel
Firestone in 1973, they gave Milken $2 million to trade
on the firm's account. 8 He made a 100% return on
investment for the firm. 9 Milken's continued success
convinced the owners of the new Drexel Burnham to
make Milken the head of a new department focused on
trading high-yield and convertible debt instruments.10
He shaped his trading division into a group of Milken
prot6g6s. 11 His group started off selling low-rated debt to
investment management firms and mutual funds that
had already bought into the Hickman philosophy, and it
grew into a deal-financing powerhouse. 12 He built a
network of investors that helped him to finance takeovers
using high-yield and convertible bonds. 13 Milken and his
team regularly made personal investments in the equity
4 Id.
5 DANIEL

FISCHEL, PAYBACK: THE CONSPIRACY TO DESTROY
MICHAEL MILKEN AND HIS FINANCIAL REVOLUTION, 23 (1996).

6 d.
7 BRUCK, supra note 2, at 29.
8 Id. at 31.
9 Id.
10
Id. at 32.
11 Id. at 32-33.
12 Id.
13 GAUGHAN, supra note 1, at 372-373.
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portions of their deals, and they reaped astounding
returns. 14

Over the course of the 1970s and early 1980s,
Milken and Drexel helped reshape American industry
and corporate finance. They turned relatively small
entrepreneurs (owners of multimillion-dollar companies)
into captains of industry. In 1985, for example, Drexel
helped Nelson Peltz and Peter May-the owners of
Triangle Industries-take over National Can. 15 Triangle
Industries generated $291 million in revenue in 1984,

compared to National Can's $1.9 billion in revenue. By
the beginning of 1986, National Can reported record
earnings and its stock price quadrupled. 16 Peltz and May
became the envy of many on Wall Street.
Correlated with the competing moral evaluations
of Milken and his leveraged buyout movement were the
competing theories on the social and financial effects of
his
success.
Milken made
several
small-scale
businessmen
into
multimillionaires,
while
simultaneously

dethroning

many

incumbent

management teams and boards of directors. 17 Daniel
Fischel categorized the winners and losers of Milken's
revolution, respectively, as "new-money challengers" and
"the establishment." 18 Fischel and other supporters of the
leveraged buyout movement praise Milken as an
innovator and attribute his fall to the envy of wellconnected old-money managers, who were able to rally
lawmakers and enforcement officials to their defense.1 9
Yet some described Drexel as creating "monsters" when
funding takeovers by men like Peltz and May.2 0 Critics
were skeptical that takeovers created real economic
14 BRUCK,

supra note 2, at 32-33

17

Id. at 105-108.
Id. at 108-109.
FISCHEL, supra note

18

Id.

15
16

5, at 23.

19 Id. at 26-28.

20

Id. at 142.
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value, and likely saw leveraged buyouts as an example of
the age-old concern that financers are merely engaged in
paper shuffling.21

II. The Decline of Milken
It is ironic that Milken's rise occurred during the
1970s while the SEC was clamping down on what it saw
as unfair trading, and that his fall occurred during the
1980s when the Commission's authority was being reined
in by the anti-regulatory Reagan administration. 22 The
turning point in Milken's career came when federal
prosecutors succeeded in having Ivan Boesky plead guilty
to a series of securities violations and enlisted Boesky to
become a witness and informant in other securities
cases. 23

In 1986, Boesky pleaded guilty to buying inside
information from Dennis Levine, a former employee of
Drexel Burnham. 24 As a part of his deal with prosecutor
Rudolph Giuliani, Boesky agreed to wear a wire and
record Milken and other targets admitting to securities
law violations. 25 In the fall of 1986, the Department of
Justice recorded a conversation between Boesky and
Milken in which the men discussed how they would
explain the $5.3 million that Boesky paid to Drexel for
what was only billed as consulting services. 26 Milken
described the $5.3 million as a payment made to close out
a partnership between Drexel and Boesky. 27 More than
21

YARON BROOK & DON WATKINS, IN PURSUIT OF WEALTH: THE

MORAL CASE FOR FINANCE, 3-4 (2017).
22

JOHN ANDERSON,

INSIDER TRADING:

REFORM, 37 (2018); FISCHEL, supra note
23 FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 105-106.

LAW,

ETHICS

AND

5, at 40.

24Id.

25 Id.
26 JESSE KORNBLUTH, HIGHLY CONFIDENT: THE CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT OF MICHAEL MILKEN 26-29 (1992).
27

Id. at 29.
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once during the conversation Boesky made statements
like "we have to have [the same story]."28 Enforcement

officials described Milken's failure to reject these
seemingly benign statements as an admission to
organizing an illegal "stock parking" scheme in
connection with the attempted Fischbach takeover. 29
Stock parking involves an agent purchasing
securities in its name on behalf of an undisclosed
principal, with the principal guaranteeing the agent

against any losses associated with the purchase. The
practice is used by large purchasers to prevent tipping-

off the rest of the stock market about its desire to buy,
which might inadvertently drive up the price of the target
stock. However, when certain undisclosed purchases are
not followed by the timely filing of a schedule 13D or 13G,
the practice violates U.S. securities regulations.
Schedules 13D and 13G have been described as necessary
"to protect companies and the investing public by giving

them notice of such accumulations because of their
potential effect on control of the company or the price of
the company's securities."3 0

In the case of the attempted Fischbach takeover,
a company owned by Posner began accumulating the
equity of Fischbach in January 1980.31 By August of that
year, Posner signed a standstill agreement with the
management of Fischbach, in which he agreed not to
accumulate more than 24.9% of the company's
outstanding equity unless an unaffiliated investor
acquired 10% or more of Fischbach's outstanding stock
and disclosed that acquisition in a Schedule 13D. 32 In
1984, Executive Life, an insurance company, acquired
28

1d. at 26.
1d. at 29.
30 S.E.C. v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 837 F.Supp.
587,
29

589 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff'd sub nom. S.E.C. v. Posner, 16 F.3d
520 (2d Cir. 1994).
31 Id. at 590-92.
32 Id.
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more than 10% of Fischbach and filed both a 13D and 13G
disclosing that fact. 33 Fischbach management responded
by acquiring Executive Life's position for a premium.

This began a dispute over whether Executive Life's initial
purchase and filing triggered an end to the standstill
agreement. Before this dispute could be resolved, Boesky
called Milken to ask if he should purchase shares in
Fischbach.
Milken and Boesky both agree that Milken
encouraged Boesky to purchase Fischbach stock, but they
disagree about the meaning of the words Milken used to
persuade Boesky. When describing the conversation
between himself and Boesky years later, Milken stated "I
do not remember what I told him six years ago, but I
indicated to him that he would not lose money . . . I

assured him that Drexel would make good on his
losses." 34 Shortly after the conversation, Steve Posner
called Boesky at Milken's request to assure him of the
safety of an investment in Fischbach. Boesky testified
that Posner responded with variations of "don't worry
about it," when he asked Posner for assurances that he
would not lose money if he bought Fischbach stock.35
At least one court found that Milken's
commitment to "making good" on a client's losses and
Posner's advice not to "worry about it" were evidence of
an illegal "stock parking" scheme. 3 6 However, Milken
described his assurances as a benign practice aimed at
retaining Boesky's firm as a client. 37 He denied a
commitment to specifically reimburse Boesky for any
losses on his Fischbach investment and describes his
assurances as an implied commitment to be a source of
other successful investment opportunities in the future.
He and Boesky both agree that they never discussed any
33

Id. at 591
Id. at 593.
35 Id. at 594.
34

36

Id. at 593.

37 Id. at 594.
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commitments by Posner to purchase stock from Boesky
or any impending takeover plans for Fischbach. However,

Boesky described Milken and Posner's vague assurances
as Wall Street code for a request for Boesky to engage in
illegal stock parking and a commitment from Milken to
insure Boesky against any losses. 38

Despite eventually having his shares purchased
by Steve Posner for a premium over the market price,39
Boesky lost $2 million on his Fischbach investment. 40 In
1987, Boesky pleaded guilty to several securities
violations, including stock parking and filing a false
Schedule 13D when purchasing his Fischbach shares. 41
He also implicated Milken as a co-conspirator in that
transaction. 42 In 1989, the government charged Milken
and Drexel with 98 counts of securities fraud, tax
evasion, and mail and wire fraud.43 Milken initially
proclaimed his innocence in a public statement and
committed to vindicating himself in court. 44 However, one
year later Milken pleaded guilty to six federal crimes,
three of which were associated with stock parking
through Boesky. 45
For many, Milken's conviction was anticlimactic.
After almost a decade-long investigation and being
charged with 98 crimes, Milken pleaded guilty to just six
of the charges. He also agreed to give up $600 million,
which many knew was just slightly more than his
38 Id. at 597-98 ("Employing a shorthand dubbed 'Wall Streetese' by Boesky in his trial testimony, Milken 'encouraged'
Boesky to buy more than 10 percent of the outstanding stock of
Fischbach and assured Boesky he would not lose any money if
he did.").
39
FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 75.
40
Id. at 77.
41

S.E.C. v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, supra note 30, at 599.

Id. at 593.
43 FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 157.
44
Id. at 160.
42

45 S.E.C. v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, supra note 30, at 599-

600.
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compensation in 1987.46 Despite initially receiving a
sentence of 10 years in prison, Milken was ultimately
only sentenced to serve 2 years and 9 months in prison
and served only 2 years in total. Many were disappointed
in this outcome given the intense scorn they felt for
Milken and the "junk bond" market he created.
III. The Moral Schism
Accounts of Michael Milken's rise and fall that
depict him as a monster are not hard to find. Connie
Bruck published the best-selling book The Predator's
Ball, which describes Milken and Drexel's "onslaught" as
introducing "terror and mayhem into countless corporate
boardrooms." 4 7 Other authors' accounts of Milken and
Drexel have titles such as Den of Thieves and A License
to Steal.48 Some critics describe Milken as a thief for
keeping a large portion of the profits on each bond
transaction for himself and his team. 49 These critics
seemed to think that Milken's bond operation should
have shared more of the profits with either the ultimate
purchasers of the bonds or with Drexel's traditional
investment banking and equity trading divisions. In
addition, many described stock parking as a significant
abuse of securities markets that harmed ordinary
investors.

However, some commentators consider Milken to
be somewhere between a humanitarian and an
unfortunate scapegoat. For example, in Payback: The
Conspiracy to Destroy Michael Milken and His Financial
Revolution economist Daniel Fischel praised the
46 FISCHEL,

supra note 5, at 150.

47 See BRUCK, supra note 1, at 19-20.
48 JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES (Simon and Schuster
1992); BENJAMIN STEIN, A LICENSE TO STEAL: THE UNTOLD
STORY OF MICHAEL MILKEN AND THE CONSPIRACY TO BILK THE

NATION (Simon & Schuster 1992).
49 FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 131.
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leveraged buyout movement in general and Milken in
particular. He described the movement and Milken as the
source of an economic revolution that forced once
unresponsive and inefficient corporate managers to focus
on making companies profitable for shareholders.5 0 In
addition to encouraging employee layoffs, the revolution
put an end to the lavish lifestyles that many corporate
executives enjoyed at the expense of their shareholders. 51
Fischel and other economists viewed Milken's fall as the
result of a smear campaign by incumbent banks and a
U.S. attorney (Giuliani) looking to make a name for
himself before seeking public office. 52
Enforcement officials and members of the Reagan
administration also held conflicting views of Milken and
the leveraged buyout movement. On the one hand, some
regulators praised the leveraged buyout market as an
engine of economic growth. In 1984, Ronald Reagan's
treasury secretary wrote a letter to Congress in which he
rejected additional anti-takeover legislation and
described leveraged buyouts as performing "several
beneficial functions in [the] economy."5 3 On the other
hand, some regulators viewed the buyout market with
suspicion and spoke out against the business practice.
For example, John S. R. Shad-a Securities and
Exchange Commissioner appointed by Reagan-attacked
the leveraged buyout movement, predicting that the
inevitable result "would be more bankruptcies and less
long-term planning." 54

50

Id. at 15-22.

Id. at 19 (describing the leveraged by of RJR Nabisco as
immediately followed by selling off 7 corporate jets, 30 luxury
apartments, and eliminating 30 athletes on retainer).
51

52 Henry G. Manne & Larry E. Ribstein, The SEC

v. the

American Shareholder: The Drexel Burnham Case, NATIONAL
REVIEW, Nov. 25, 1988, at 26(4).
53 FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 38.
54
Id.
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There is even some evidence that individual
officials sometimes internalized these conflicts. For
example, Shad stated that the markets themselves would
be able to handle the threat from leveraged buyouts. 55
However, opposing the LBO movement while trusting in

the market to stop it is strange given that it was the
market that produced the movement. In addition, prior
to becoming an impassioned prosecutor of white-collar
criminals, Giuliani made several public comments
describing the focus on white collar crime (instead of on
gangs and drugs) as a waste of government resources. 56

His conversion to a champion of cracking down on Wall
Street therefore seems a little inconsistent (if not
disingenuous).
Even Michael Milken may not have been fully
convinced of the virtue of his business methods. In the
late 1980s, after several years of government leaks about
the details of the Milken investigation, Milken hired a
public relations firm to rehabilitate his image. 57 Instead
of the firm praising the value of leveraged buyouts and
high-yield

investments,

it

spent

time

publicizing

Milken's charitable works. 58 The decision to focus on
Milken's work outside of his profession may have been
based on the expectation that the public would only
respond positively to information about selfless deeds.
However, because Milken did not demand a campaign
singing the praises of high-yield bonds, it makes sense to
suspect that he was not sure that his actions were
morally acceptable.

IV. Conclusion

55 Id.
56
Id. at 99.
57
Id. at 161.
58 Id.
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Acknowledging
these
conflicting
moral
evaluations by some of the nation's most influential
industrialists and government officials is useful for
understanding some of the confusion in U.S. securities
regulation. There are several areas of securities law in
which liability turns on some conception of what kind of
market activity is "fair." 59 It makes for muddled legal
doctrines when we cannot agree about the fairness of
trading with an information advantage or the fairness of
agents purchasing securities for an undisclosed principle.
In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, the defendants
faced liability because they were described as unfairly
trading in the company's stock based on undisclosed
information about a rich mineral find in Timmins,
Ontario, Canada. 60 Yet in Leitch Gold Mines Ltd. v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur, a Canadian court applying common law
contract principles deemed it acceptable for Texas Gulf
Sulphur to use undisclosed information to purchase the
mineral rights needed to profit from the same discovery. 61
Ivan Boesky was charged and pleaded guilty to insider
trading and other securities violations. However, the
SEC authorized Boesky to engage in what many
considered insider trading by secretly liquidating his
portfolio to pay his $100 million fine. 62 Outside of
securities markets, trade secret doctrine protects and
incentivizes trading on asymmetric information and this
protection is described as fostering fair competition. 63
Moreover,
agency doctrine protects the use of

59 See, e.g., SEC Selective Disclosureand Insider Trading, 17
C.F.R. §§ 240, 243, 249 (describing Regulation FD-Fair
Disclosure).
60
S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
61 Leitch Gold Mines Ltd. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 1968
CarswellOnt 318 (1968).
62 FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 107.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39. See
also Metallurgical Industries Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d
63

1195, 1201 (5th Cir. 1986).
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intermediaries to mask the identity of principals in the
market place. 64
Understanding this moral schism may help to
either resolve paradoxes or eliminate unnecessary
conflicts within American law and culture.

64 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY

§

4.
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